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Mehrangiz Kar
February 9th, 2010
A while ago, Mrs. Hilary Clinton said: “We expect more from Iran.” Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, rejoicing in the transformation in foreign policy from the White House and its serious inclination to understand the need of the Iranian government to maintain its stance regarding the development of nuclear energy from a purely public relations perspective, said that “he is pleased to enter into negotiations with the American representative in Geneva.”
Within a short period of time, the hopes of both sides were quashed and it is not clear which third power interfered to revive the same old stories and deceptions. It is between the bilateral attempt at reconciliation and recurring antagonisms that the political crisis in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections reached a climax. Following the change in U.S.-Iran relations in October 2009 and subsequent events, a socio-political movement formed and became known as the “Green Movement.”
The members of the “Green Movement” were initially taken aback by U.S. outreach to the Ahmadinejad government and recoiled at this development. But now the Ahmadinejad government’s termination of these negotiations has caused much happiness among the participants of the movement. According to the movement, its concerns regarding the reconciliation between the U.S. and Iran during Ahmadinejad’s presidency has been diminished and the prospects for future reconciliation seem dimmer by the minute. A general look at the ups and downs of recent developments indicates that Iranians do not present a unified opinion on this matter. Moreover, because conducting opinion polls in Iran’s security regime is considered a crime if it doesn’t reflect the regime’s preferences, Iranians have no democratic means to use opinions as a statement of their hopes and fears. Iranians have only suffered as a result of the three decade long breach in Iran-U.S. relations and now, in some Iranian circles, the long lost hope for improved relations has been filled with worry and apprehension over the possibility of increased oppression that more friendly relations with the U.S. could afford the Iranian regime. Maybe if the signs of reform in relations had been apparent before they became public, the Iranian people would have been more welcoming of them, but the mere delay of five months was enough to chill the atmosphere and there are few Iranians who did not shed tears at the prospect of this change in relations.
A large crowd, both inside and outside Iran staged peaceful protests in response to the outcome of the 2009 presidential elections, without any demands for “regime change” or “foreign interference.” They described the events of the past months as troublesome and sat in expectation, with eyes glued to President Obama, that besides providing safe space for the opinions and demands of Iran’s nuclear energy team, he will also pay heed to Iran’s human rights record and insist on the dire necessity of a safe environment for the freedom of speech. Iranians don’t want to see their human rights treated as a decorative good or a colorful vase on a negotiating table. The mandate for human rights has become a serious and passionate pursuit for the Iranian masses, and has become the main priority since the election of June 12, 2009. Sometimes, in their excess enthusiasm, they forget that Mr. Obama is the president of the United States, and they speak as if he is the president of Iran as well. Iranians, like many others around the world, have been so taken in by Mr. Obama’s appealing words that they have tied all hopes to him, outside a diplomatic framework. This, of course, makes Mr. Obama’s work even harder. The Nobel Peace Prize has further increased the burden on Mr. Obama and in such a situation, striking a balance between America’s national interest and the extensive demands for human rights in the rest of the world is not easy. Regardless, in the historical context of developments in U.S.-Iran relations, this situation is unique in it own way. Paradoxically, he shows up at meetings and gatherings of Iranians outside the country that represent a combination of those who are enamored with Mr. Obama and those who are worried about the changed tone in U.S. policy toward Mr. Ahmadinejad’s government. During one such gathering, a young educated woman who had recently left Iran asked, with a shaky voice: “In your opinion, is President Obama not betraying the trust of the Iranian people?” This young woman had witnessed the events that unfolded in Iranian streets after the election and did not want to believe that Mr. Obama, the president of a most powerful country, is responsible mainly for advocating the national interests of his own country. These national interests are not necessarily Iran’s national interests.
It is obvious that Mr. Obama is the president of the United States. It is also obvious that in the eyes of a large group of Iranians, Mr. Ahmadinejad is not the president of Iran, and regardless of the presence of election fraud, the huge numbers of peacefully protesting crowds did not leave him with much legitimacy. However, international law does not allow President Obama to not recognize Mr. Ahmadinejad as the official president, especially since Mr. Ahmadinejad is under the authorization of the of the “Supreme Leader”—who holds the highest seat of power in the Iranian government. Mr. Karrubi has recently offered a clear explanation for this. The announcement of his apparent acceptance of the Ahamdinejad government, as a result of his being approved by the leader, is a clear indication that the legal-political regime of Iran is deficient in one aspect: “rule by the people.”
This becomes paradoxical when we return to Mr. Obama’s infrequent but pleasing campaign speeches which were widely followed in Iran. These words of Mr. Obama during the presidential campaign broke off with many diplomatic frameworks and explained international law in a different way. He insisted that the United States would not be secure until the world became safe and human life on earth became just. The whole world, and not just the indignant and furious post-election Iranians, has been taken by surprise by the person of Mr. Obama and his major break with global political calculations, leading to an increased pace of demands from America. As a knowledgeable, powerful, young and peace loving personality, he has filled the hearts of the persecuted and let me honestly say that he has become a “king of hearts.” Thus, those hearts that have been conquered by him do not pay heed to international laws or anything of that nature. Rightly or wrongly, a large group of Iranians have convinced themselves that Mr. Obama will not rest until the gravity of the human rights condition in Iran is alleviated?!
It is surprising and paradoxical that Iranians allow themselves to define America’s national interest, asserting that entering a dialogue with Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s government is not beneficial to America’s national interest. Of course, this section of Iran’s population can be divided into two groups: those who represent the requests of the minority and another group that represents the requests of the majority. The minority request is that the two issues of nuclear energy and human rights be put on the negotiating table in equal terms, and to convince the Iranian side of the immediate need for improving human rights conditions.
The majority request is that Mr. Ahmadinejad and his government not be allowed to participate in negotiations. Thus, many Iranians do not want the US government to reconcile with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
What we have seen and heard indicates that for the time, neither the demands of the minority nor those of the majority are included in U.S. policy plans. It is understandable that turning the page is not easy. Iranian human rights activists are aware of these difficulties and are merely demanding a small amount of “balance” in U.S. foreign policy toward Iran. They expect that however much the U.S. government officially recognizes a nuclear Iran and provides the means for maintaining the pride and prestige and confidence of the Iranian regime, they should also be aware of the significance of maintaining the confidence of the Iranian people. Reconciliation with the government without empathy for people’s rights will not end happily. This group of Iranians does not ask the U.S. for assistance in bringing about regime change in Iran, but at the same time, they do not see any harm in asking the U.S. government to put pressure on the Iranian regime to change its behavior towards its own people. It may be the first time in political history that a country that is not part of the great powers, allows itself to determine the limits of the national interests of the world’s only superpower. This is an important development and is a reflection of the people’s self confidence. Regardless of what they have lost in these past thirty years, they have gained an inconceivable degree of confidence which is sometimes confused with arrogance.
Naturally, we cannot expect Iranians who are mourning the loss of their vote or grieving the loss of their loved ones or prisoners to be happy about the changed path in U.S. foreign policy or to express pleasure in the fact that Afghanistan and Iraq will be more secure as a result of this policy change, without voicing their own fears and concerns. These dissatisfied Iranians choose to voice their concerns so that President Obama will not open the doors to those leaders who do not represent their people and leave the people behind closed doors.
Both Iran and the U.S. are somewhat unusual. As in America, political observers and analysts in Iran have developed differences of opinion amongst themselves. Some are of the opinion that we should not use the post-election events as an excuse to strain relations with the U.S. The issue of renewed relations is of high importance and even if it provides opportunities for negotiation with the current officials of the 10th government elected in June 2009, in the long run, Iranians will have better access to democratic channels. They claim that we should not give in to emotions and put forth conditions that will break off all negotiations. They question the benefit that 30 years of disrupted relations with America has afforded Iranians? More important, why have Iranians just recently realized that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is not the legitimate representative of the Iranian people? Was Iran a democracy before these elections, and were Iranian government officials the true representatives of the Iranian people then? It is to the advantage of a people whose political, economic, social and cultural situation has consistently deteriorated during these past thirty years and who, despite all their efforts, have been unable to bring about change or even reform within the regime, to view the change in U.S. policy as a positive change.
Another group of political observers criticize the new flexibility of U.S. foreign policy. They correlate the recent military-security movements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a direct result of the Iranian government’s reliance on its future friendship with America.
Both views are extreme and one-sided. Now, more than ever, Iranians need balance and stability. They view Iran’s relations with America in the past thirty years as lacking balance and stability. U.S. foreign policy was considered aggressive when the threat of an attack had entered the equation in a serious manner and the Iranian government had been included in the “axis of evil.” It is natural that after such a categorization they could not enter negotiations with the Iranian government. Current U.S. foreign policy toward Iran has pursued a different form of instability. It seems so accommodating that it has afforded the Iranian government the opportunity to act like North Korea and test a couple of publicity bombs to frighten the Americans from bringing up human rights issues for fear that Iran will leave the negotiating table.
Regardless of all these explanations and accounts, the Iranian people need America as much as they need oxygen. However, it is not rational for the American government to ignore the human rights breaches linked to the recent election crisis in Iran. The fact that the imminent threat of war and terror has lowered the American priority for focusing on human rights issues, is not enough of a justification for the Iranian government to give international human rights organizations the runaround and avoid the need to reform the human rights situation in its own country. Currently, human rights and women’s rights activists are either in prison or fugitives or forced into silence as the only suitable response to the existing situation. In all three instances, those political activists who are participating in protests today are facing oppression alone.
With President Obama’s entrance into the White House, the unfavorable human rights policy pursued by the Americans as a justification for the war on terror was analyzed and criticized by the highest incoming U.S. officials as a reform initiative. Why does the Iranian government sign so many international human rights treaties but does not follow them and replaces the policy of human rights reform with one of denial and obstinacy?
Iranian human rights activists are not politicians. But their demand and insistence on improving the human rights situation in Iran is very serious. Those human rights activists who have been forced to leave the country or are incarcerated or whose safety is in question generally believe that the new U.S. administration does not oppose including human rights issues on the negotiating table.
What is certain is that the situation has changed in the past two or three months--there are no longer any accepted norms for negotiations. The majority of human rights activists are either in prison or are on the run or are silent and on their way out of Iran. The Vienna conference fell apart and it is not clear what political factor poisoned the negotiations atmosphere. The United States and its allies are working non-stop to convince Iran to enter negotiations.
As much as they speak of diplomatic opportunities, they have not taken the likelihood of a military attack off the table. Iran is cautious in its responses. Critics and dissenters of the regime view the breakdown of preparations for talks as a positive development. However, Iranians have not taken sides in such a puzzling state of affairs. Relations between Iran and the United States remain dark and uncertain and it is impossible to predict its future. Human rights conditions have worsened in Iran and their gravity increases with every moment. This is one more proof that the oppressive policies of the Iranian government have no direct relation to improved relations with America, but that without this improvement, it will become increasingly oppressive.
Therefore, those persons and groups who insist that Iranians will be met with more oppression with the start of negotiations between Iran and the United States, and that the government will feel more secure in carrying out its repressive policies, are not basing such suppositions on sound judgment and it is best that they revise their attitude toward this issue.
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